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Instrumental Rationality
Markus Domeier* , Pierre Sachse and Bernd Schäfer
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The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the
so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological
need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106),
participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they
could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution
that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option (SCO)
was the most chosen option, supporting the hypothesis of this study. The reason
behind the majority of participants choosing the SCO seemed to be the satisfaction
of psychological needs, despite a reduced chance of winning money. An intervention,
which aimed at triggering self-reflection, had no impact on the decision. The findings
of this study contribute to the discussion on the reasons for cognitive biases and
their formation in the human mind. Moreover, it discusses the application of the label
“irrational” for biased decisions and proposes reasons for instrumental rationality, which
exist at an unconscious, need-regulative level.
Keywords: need regulation, PSI theory, cognitive bias, irrational decision, sunk-cost effect, decision-making,
debiasing
INTRODUCTION
According to a dolphin, Michael Phelps is a lousy swimmer. According to a cheetah, Usain Bolt
runs in slow motion. According to the homo oeconomicus model, people predominantly make
decisions irrationally. Do these judgments appear fair to you? In the first two cases, it seems rather
clear that an inappropriate frame is being applied to assess these individuals’ ability in swimming
or running. However, the third statement still comes up repeatedly when human decision-making
abilities are being judged (Magrabi and Bach, 2013). The homo oeconomicus model (Simon,
1955) describes human beings as rational agents, who mostly follow monetary goals, have stable
preferences, maximize subjective utility, and ignore sunk-costs.
However, studies show that actual human performance in decision-making deviates from
this model (Stanovich and West, 2000), influenced by so-called cognitive biases, departing
systematically from the normative standards (Kerr et al., 1996). These biases have an effect on real-
life decision-making (for a taxonomy of cognitive biases see Carter et al., 2007; Stanovich et al.,
2008). Based on 20 years of past work analyzing 100s of business decisions, Nutt (2002) affirms
that 50% of all decisions fail. This number could lead to the impression that the human mind is
hopelessly flawed, thereby confirming the accusation of “irrational.”
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However, Cohen (1981) has a more positive view of the
human reasoning ability. He argues that errors should not
be seen as proof of human irrationality. He assumes that
errors originate from three areas: the normative system, the
interpretation problem, and the external validity problem (Evans,
1993). Errors are rated in relation to a normative system that
depends on the understanding of logic and deductive reasoning.
However, that system does not necessarily fit to behavior in
the real world. The interpretation problem concerns the fact
that participants do not necessarily understand the task in the
same way the instructor thinks they should. Finally, the external
validity problem describes the fact that many tasks in the lab are
somewhat artificial and have little in common with real-life tasks.
In Cohen’s view, errors can only be rated as such when, under
ideal conditions, a person agrees that it is an error. He concludes
that no present or future findings in literature or research can
lead to the assumption of faulty competence in human reasoning.
He instead points to patterns of illusions, which might be active
during reasoning and could lead to faulty conclusions.
Evans and Pollard (1981) criticized this line of argumentation,
as it offers low practical relevance. Specifically, they consider that
realistic tasks could also lead to biases, as personal experiences
and emotions can influence the participants’ behavior. Moreover,
they express that pointing to illusions, as Cohen (1981) mentions,
does not clarify the conditions when an individual is “rational,”
or presents a “cognitive illusion,” and what the “ideal conditions”
are. Although some of this criticism might apply, Evans (2005)
disagrees with the assumption that task designs should be
considered artificial, as many well-researched effects in the
laboratory have been successfully transferred to the real world.
One approach to deal with the problem of the normative
system is distinguishing between two kinds of rationality. The
first refers to personal/instrumental reasoning, which is used to
achieve one’s goals; the second refers to normative reasoning,
which occurs in relation to a normative system (Evans and Over,
1996). These terms have been presented earlier as rationality1
and rationality2, respectively (Evans, 1993; Evans et al., 1993).
This distinction might explain errors, especially when individuals
violate the normative rationality and persist with their personal
rationality to achieve their goals. Other distinctions of rationality
(Stanovich and West, 2000) focus on the difference between
evolutionarily developed rationality and individual rationality.
These two distinctions might not always correspond, especially
in our modern world.
In general, Elqayam and Evans (2011) express doubts about
the prevailing role of normativism; this approach assumes that
human rationality should be evaluated to the degree that it
corresponds to a normative standard. Therefore, they proposed a
descriptivist paradigm, which “favors an instrumental, pragmatic
conception of rationality, based on achievements of one’s goals”
(Elqayam, 2012, p. 628). More specifically, Elqayam (2012)
presents a descriptive approach that focuses more on the actual
behavior but goes beyond mere description. Descriptivism is
based on instrumental rationality, that is, the achievement
of personal goals and casts doubt on the supremacy of
normative rationality. The latter is not completely excluded
but integrated as a subcategory of instrumental rationality.
However, if you omit the normative approach, which reference
would guide you in the evaluation of behavior? Elqayam (2012)
proposes “grounded rationality” to address these concerns. This
framework aims to evaluate the rationality of human behavior
without referring to a universal standard. Elqayam (2012, p. 43)
proposed a first working definition of grounded rationality:
“Behavior B is rational for agent A, in epistemic context E,
if B facilitates achievement of A’s goals within the constraints
of E.” The approach focuses on the achievement of personal
goals. The epistemic context includes everything that affects the
beliefs and desires of a person, and the constraints cover all
physical or mental limitations which human beings might have.
Therefore, grounded rationality combines bounded rationality
with cognitive variability.
Focusing on the rationality concerning cognitive biases,
Tetlock and Mellers (2002) provided another perspective,
emphasizing the possibility of reinterpreting cognitive biases
and, thus, showing possible “upsides” to these apparently
poor decisions. Looking at the example of entrepreneurs
demonstrating the overconfidence effect, defined as a systematic
overestimation of probabilities (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), the
authors reflect that this bias could also be the reason behind
success because it allows them to overcome paralyzing loss
aversion, taking more risks in business ventures. This interesting
point of view leads to the question of whether biases can involve
rationales outside the conventional frame of assessment.
We agree with the position that people sometimes rather
follow instrumental rationality (to achieve their goals) than
normative rationality. In the present study, we sought to take
a closer look at these personal goals and which role they play
when people present a “bias” in decision-making, which means
that they engage in behaviors that are not expected from the
viewpoint of the normative theory. As an example of an effect
that is typically referred to as a bias, we chose the sunk-
cost effect. Our focus concerning personal goals lies in the
role of motivational needs, especially the need for competence.
Following the descriptive approach from Elqayam and Evans
(2011) and Elqayam (2012), we aimed to determine which
behavior is rational for individuals to achieve their personal goals
in a given context.
Understanding the Effects Called
“Cognitive Biases”
The term “bias” (as well as “debiasing”) itself implies that
there is an undistorted and normative standard from which
the behavior deviates (Kerr et al., 1996). Thus, the term in
itself is directly judgmental and as it is widely used, shows
the dominance of the normative research tradition in the field
of decision-making. The term evaluates behavior only from
one perspective (normative rationality) and does not sufficiently
consider alternative perspectives (i.e., instrumental rationality).
Although we do not follow this prejudgment, the term “bias” is
used in the following article for two reasons. First, to maintain
a connection with the previous research tradition at least in
wording (e.g., Heuristics and Biases Program, Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), and second, to clarify that behavior can
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 815
fpsyg-09-00815 May 23, 2018 Time: 17:43 # 3
Domeier et al. Sunk-Cost Effect’s Instrumental Rationality
be “biased” and “useful” at the same time, depending on the
perspective.
If we want to find the instrumental rationality in relation to
cognitive biases, we need to clearly understand their function,
and the purpose they might have. Therefore, the goal should not
only be to eliminate or reduce biases but also to understand them
and identify their negative and possible positive effects. Despite
the fast-growing literature in the field of decision-making, there
is still a lack of understanding on how to overcome or how to
understand biases (Milkman et al., 2009). According to Fischhoff
(1982), the best way to reduce biases would be to have a better
understanding of mental processes in general. This would add
motivational and emotional aspects to the focus on cognition
in decision research. There are interesting developments in
this field, for example, the concept of “actively open-minded
thinking” (Baron, 1993; Haran et al., 2013). Besides other aspects,
it describes a tendency during the decision process to weigh new
evidence against a favored belief. As discussed before, if people
follow an instrumental rationality when making a decision,
they pursue personal goals. Therefore, we need a task design,
wherein the variety of personal goals—including motivational
aspects—can be observed. Research on the sunk-cost effect, for
instance, shows that most of the tasks utilized mainly dealt
with cognitive aspects, and therefore, present a low potential
for triggering motivational and emotional processes (e.g., van
Putten et al., 2010; Hafenbrack et al., 2014). In this regard, after
conducting a comprehensive overview of judgment and decision-
making research, Weber and Johnson (2009) suggested that it
is important to connect more of the research to theories of
motivational and emotional processes.
Psi: A Theory of the Human Mind
To gain a better understanding of the human mind regarding
the motivational, emotional, and cognitive processes, a unifying
theory is called for. The Psi theory (Dörner, 1999; Dörner et al.,
2002; Bach, 2009; Dörner and Güss, 2013) presents a holistic
architecture of the human mind. Unlike other architectures, such
as State, Operator, and Result (SOAR, Newell, 1987) and the
Adaptive Control Thought-Rational theory (ACT-R, Anderson,
1990), the Psi theory integrates the emotional and motivational
aspects into the cognitive system. As the theory is particularly
extensive, we focused on the concept of motivational needs
within the theory.
In the Psi theory, five different needs are distinguished:
(1) existential needs (thirst-, hunger-, and pain avoidance), (2)
the need for sexuality, (3) the need for affiliation (positive
signals from others), (4) the need for certainty (predictability),
and (5) the need for competence (active control). Of these
five needs, we will focus on the need for competence. Several
researchers from various fields view competence as a central
need and a drive for human behavior (Bischof, 1987; Adler,
1912; Deci and Ryan, 2000). The need for competence refers
to having active control over a situation. This includes the
extent to which a person feels capable of handling the problems
presented by their environment. This need also encompasses
the need for power, control, or autonomy, and is connected
to status, self-competence, and self-worth (Dörner et al., 2002).
According to Bach (2012), three different kinds of competence
can be distinguished: epistemic competence (coping with any
specific task), general competence (overall ability to cope with
the environment), and effect-related competence (ability to
have an effective impact on the environment). Across all three
variations, the need for competence is met through the successful
satisfaction of other needs, when the person experiences success,
especially in demanding situations, and in general when they
perceive competence signals. The need for competence is
frustrated through failed attempts to satisfy needs in general, the
loss of active control, signals arising from failing, and signals of
incompetence (Dörner et al., 2002).
Dörner (1999) compares the function of these needs to a
reservoir, which has an inherently limited capacity. Positive
information fills the reservoir, and negative information leads to
a drain. When an individual interacts with the environment, the
incoming information is assessed. Depending on the assessment
of the situation concerning aspects, such as importance, urgency,
threat, subjective competence to cope with the situation, past
history of the information, relevance, and anticipation of further
development (Detje, 1999), the situation is rated as positive
or negative in relation to the level of the reservoir. In the
interaction with the environment, the actual level of the reservoir
might differ from the target level. If the level drops below the
target level, a need becomes active. The further and faster this
level drops, the higher the pressure to satisfy the need. If the
assessment of the situation is rated as an actual or potential
future threat to the need, an urge arises, and the process of need-
regulation is initiated. Overall, this process follows a homeostatic
principle, aiming at balancing motivational needs in the dynamic
environment (Bach, 2009). Satisfaction of the “need pressure”
is followed by a pleasure signal; whereas, a high need pressure
generates a displeasure signal. Most of these processes occur at
the unconscious level. However, the individual can experience the
result consciously when it feels “good” or “bad.”
According to the Psi theory, there is a difference between
goal-oriented and need-oriented behavior. A goal is defined as
a situation associated with a motivational value (Bach, 2009). Of
course, every behavior is somehow goal-oriented and motivated
in some way. However, the distinction between goals and needs
in the Psi theory has another underlying meaning. A goal, in
general, describes an entity that directs the behavior. A goal
according to the Psi theory is best compared to an “objective
goal” (“Sachziel,” Strohschneider, 2003). On the other hand,
need-oriented behavior refers to a behavior focused on the
satisfaction of needs. For example, a student has to finish a
research paper (Dörner and Güss, 2013). The paper represents
the objective goal. Completing and submitting the thesis would
give the student a strong feeling of competence. However, this
goal feels far away when the student is sitting at his/her desk and
struggles with the content, therefore receiving a lot of inefficacy-
signals. Frustrated, he/she stops working on the paper and starts
doing the dishes instead. Washing the dishes does not bring
him/her closer to finishing the paper but regulates the need for
competence by creating a feeling of being effective in the short
run. In the long run, the remaining time to finish the paper runs
out. The orientation of the behavior changed from a long-term
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goal-orientated objective (finishing the paper) to a short-term
need-oriented activity (getting efficacy-signals from doing the
dishes).
Another approach that also sheds light on the underlying
mental processes that occur during the reasoning processes
is found in the Meta-Reasoning framework of Ackerman and
Thompson (2017). Particularly, the framework refers to the
processes that monitor the progress of reasoning and how
well a process has unfolded. The states of these processes are
experienced as feelings of certainty or uncertainty. The level of
certainty experienced is an important aspect of the reasoning
process. If a certain level of certainty is reached, a judgment is
made. However, the level is not permanently set. According to
the duration of the task, the level can sink, thereby leading to
judgments with lower requirements for certainty (Diminishing
Criterion Model, Ackerman, 2014). During the task, a “feeling of
rightness” is experienced if a first solution feels right (Thompson
et al., 2011; Ackerman and Thompson, 2017). In the Psi theory,
the “feeling of rightness” refers to the level of confidence a person
ascribes to a solution option and its anticipated potential for
need-satisfaction. This concept is similar to the “good” or “bad”
feeling in Psi, which is the result of the need-satisfaction itself.
In the Meta-Reasoning framework, certainty plays a central role
when implementing an action. The Psi theory also determines the
action depending on the need for certainty but additionally, it
includes the need for competence and describes action as a result
of the interaction between both of these needs (Dörner and Güss,
2013).
Influence of Motivation on
Decision-Making
Decision-making is part of the problem-solving process (Güss
and Robinson, 2014). The act of decision-making can be
described as the ability to choose one of several alternatives and
to act accordingly (Güss, 2004). Mostly, the goal of a decision lies
in the future (Hsee and Hastie, 2006). That means, when making
a good decision, an individual has to pick an alternative in the
present moment, which best fulfills the future requirements of
an upcoming situation (Pronin et al., 2008). Güss et al. (2017)
emphasize the role of motivation in complex problem-solving;
consequently, motivation also has an influence on decision-
making.
Decisions do not take place in a vacuum; the needs are
influenced by specific characteristics of the situation (Dörner,
1999). Depending on the subjective assessment, the situation
is rated as positive or negative with respect to the needs, and
therefore, has an influence on the levels in the reservoirs.
Subsequently, the individual also looks for aspects in the options,
which could mean the fulfillment of their actual needs. Thus,
the available options are not only assessed with regard to their
goal-reaching potential but also by their need-fulfilling potential.
However, this process does not necessarily have to be conscious.
Errors can arise when the logic of acting changes from goal-
oriented rationality to need-oriented rationality (Dörner, 1996);
that is, when the individual unconsciously shifts regarding the
decision, moving from the original objective to a sole focus on
the satisfaction of one or several needs. The consequence of such
a scenario is that an option is selected to satisfy motivational
needs, rather than best fulfill the requirements of the situation.
This also implies a short-term advantage (i.e., the feeling of
competence being maintained) and long-term disadvantage (i.e.,
the actual goal not being reached). However, there is also the
possibility of satisfactorily meeting both needs and present goals
with a single decision, especially in cases when the goal equals
the fulfillment of needs. As these cases usually do not lead
to difficult decisions, because it is a win-win situation, we
focused on decisions where the goal and fulfillment of needs
differed. We assume that in these cases, regulation can take place
over the formation of cognitive biases, as they could serve the
(unconscious) preservation of needs or increase the levels in
the need reservoirs. Ignoring counterfactual information, over-
or underestimating probabilities, and staying with the familiar
option are all possible ways to regulate the needs (Dörner et al.,
2002; Dörner and Güss, 2013).
The Sunk-Cost Effect
One of the best-known effects, which is considered a cognitive
bias, is the sunk-cost effect. It is defined as a “tendency to
continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or
time has been made” (Arkes and Blumer, 1985, p. 124). This
means that when individuals exhibit sunk-cost effect behavior,
they persist with the option which they have already invested
in and resist changing to another option that might be more
suitable regarding the future requirements of the situation
(Arkes and Ayton, 1999; Hastie and Dawes, 2001). Moon (2001)
distinguishes two different situations in which the sunk-cost
effect occurs. The first is described as “utilization decision,” a
decision wherein the decision maker has to choose between
two equal alternatives. Roth et al. (2015) illustrated this type of
decision with the example of a person who purchased a ticket to
a play at the local theater but later gets invited by a good friend to
a special Italian dinner. Even when the person prefers attending
the dinner, he/she thinks about the sunk cost already paid for the
ticket and decides to go to the play.
The second situation is as a “progress decision,” that describes
a situation where the decision hinges upon whether or not a
chosen pathway should be continued or not. An example of this
type of decision is found in the building of the supersonic plane
Concorde. Already in the early development stages, the costs
rose higher than expected, and the financial success was unclear.
Nevertheless, the project was not stopped but further funded
because of the amount of money that was already invested (Arkes
and Ayton, 1999). Experiences in economics do not help to
sustain the sunk-cost effect. A meta-analysis by Roth et al. (2015),
which involved solely monetary sunk-cost decisions, revealed
that an economic background on the part of the participants does
not have a significant influence on utilization decisions.
There are different approaches to explain the occurrence of the
sunk-cost effect. van Putten et al. (2010) differentiated between
individuals with a “state orientation,” who struggle to let go
of past events, and individuals with an “action orientation,”
who seem relatively untroubled by past events. They found that
state-oriented decision-makers were more prone to exhibit the
sunk-cost effect. Other researchers bring in further aspects, such
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as people not wanting to appear wasteful (Arkes and Blumer,
1985), the effect of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985), or the
escalation of commitment (Schaubroeck and Davis, 1994; Carter
et al., 2007). Most of the time, sunk-cost effect studies involve
hypothetical scenarios. In some cases, a situation is described
which places the participants in a position where they have to
make a decision (“Imagine you are the CEO of . . .”) (see van
Putten et al., 2010; Hafenbrack et al., 2014) concerning whether
a course of action or project they have already invested in should
be continued and, therefore, supported financially, even when a
competitor presents a more promising solution. In these cases,
participants often have to make a decision involving millions
of theoretical dollars of investment. However, most of these
cases seem rather artificial, as ‘normal’ participants suddenly are
required to imagine that they are a CEO with great responsibility.
Moreover, most of these cases only address money (Roth et al.,
2015), and focus less, if at all, on time or effort. Even when they
do, it is only within a hypothetical frame.
Self-Reflection as a “Debiasing”
Intervention
There are various approaches that could improve
decision-making, preventing decision-makers from committing
the so-called cognitive biases (Soll et al., 2015). These approaches
can be summed up as “debiasing” interventions. As discussed
before, the problem with the term “bias” also concerns the term
“debiasing” which is used to describe interventions that aim to
eliminate biases. This process should eventually lead to a decision
outcome which corresponds to a normative rationality. However,
despite the focus on normative rationality, biases can also make
the decision-maker aware of the different rationalities he or she
might follow in a given situation.
One of these debiasing interventions is to initiate a process of
self-reflection to unveil biases running at the unconscious level
(Donovan et al., 2015; Phillips et al., 2016). Hafenbrack et al.
(2014) found that including a meditation-based intervention to
prevent the sunk-cost effect seems to be an effective approach to
lead participants to focus more on the actual situation, and less
on the past, where the sunk costs took place. Another approach
to initiate a process of self-reflection is to let decision-makers
assess the situation from an external point of view. There is a
difference between making decisions for ourselves and for others.
Various studies on the concept of self-other decision-making have
shown that individuals making a decision for others focus on
fewer attributes and make the decision more readily (Kray and
Gonzalez, 1999), focus less on feelings (Hsee and Weber, 1997;
Hong and Chang, 2015), and make more risk-averse decisions
when risk-aversion is pertinent to the situation (Stone et al.,
2013). A debiasing intervention designed by Kahneman et al.
(2011) aims at exhibiting this effect, as the individual is forced to
evaluate the decision from an external point of view (“How would
a new CEO decide?”). In the case of the sunk-cost effect, this
should disclose unrelated motivational factors, as the decision-
maker has to analyze the decision from an external point of view.
In our study, the aim of the debiasing intervention was to make
participants aware of the normative rationality they follow when
deciding for others and to adopt this normative rationality when
deciding for themselves. Therefore, this change of perspective
should draw attention to aspects that are important for reaching
the objective goals of a situation, and less on subjective aspects
which are only important from the view of the decision-maker.
Thus, the intervention should ultimately lead to a more goal-
oriented decision (Strohschneider, 2003). As a general point,
Strough et al. (2016) highlight the importance of understanding
the mental models and existing beliefs of participants when
designing an intervention.
Aims of the Present Study
The current theoretical background suggests that there is still
little understanding of how and why these effects, in our example
the sunk-cost effect, occur. However, a better understanding
would have significant positive effects, leading to better decision-
making (up to 7% higher return after reducing the effect of
biases in business decisions, Kahneman et al., 2011). Therefore,
the present study aims to address the following questions: which
goals do people follow when they demonstrate instrumental
rationality (Evans and Over, 1996), and what role does the
unconscious need regulation play in the formation of these
goals? What would a structured experimental design that aims
to capture the complexity of a real-life situation look like?
(Dörner and Funke, 2017). Finally, can an intervention influence
the rationalities that the decision-maker follows? We conducted
a study designed to analyze participants’ decisions in a more
realistic sunk-cost scenario. Participants were asked to choose
between a sunk-cost option (SCO) and an alternative option
(AO), whereby one group received an intervention with the aim
of interrupting the choice of the SCO.
We derived the following hypotheses: biased decisions
(i.e., taking the SCO) have their root in unconscious need
regulation, triggered by sunk costs. As proposed in the Psi
theory (Dörner, 1999; Bach, 2009; Dörner and Güss, 2013), we
assumed that need regulation is positively linked to choosing
the SCO (Hypothesis 1). Accordingly, we hypothesized that
participants who choose the SCO show lower levels of self-
reflection (Hypothesis 2a), achievement motives, and self-control
(Hypothesis 2b). Research indicates that biases can be prevented
by inducing a process of self-reflection (Hsee and Weber, 1997;
Kahneman et al., 2011; Hong and Chang, 2015). Consequently,
we hypothesized that an intervention fostering self-reflection
prevents decision-makers from choosing the SCO (Hypothesis 3).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
To motivate the participants, we created a more “involving”
experimental scenario to test the hypothesized mechanism, in
which all three aspects of the sunk-cost effect were present.
Participants were required to work on their own project (effort),
into which they invested their own time and money, and had to
decide whether to persist with their own project or choose an
alternative and more promising option, in an attempt to win the
remaining sum of their investment. Following the understanding
of Greitemeyer et al. (2005), when participants chose their own
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option, in which they had already invested, even when the AO
offered a higher chance of winning money, their choice was rated
as a sunk-cost effect.
Against the background of the Psi theory concerning
psychological needs, we aimed to unveil the underlying
mechanisms and reasons why people choose the SCO. The
question was: can we observe need-regulation through the
actions of participants who choose the SCO (SCO-Selectors)
reporting greater need-satisfaction than participants who choose
the Alternative Option (AO-Selectors)? Moreover, we tested an
intervention (Kahneman et al., 2011) designed to induce a change
of perspective regarding the decision and reduce the sunk-cost
effect, with the aim of generating a more goal-oriented, and less
need-oriented, decision.
Participants
From a total of 138 adult participants who were recruited for
the experiment, 13 were excluded due to missing data (n = 2),
unfinished construction (n = 4), misunderstanding of the task,
error in the experimental flow (n = 3), and knowledge of the task
(n = 4). Another 19 participants from the pre-testing phase were
also excluded, as the task was slightly adapted. The remaining 106
participants (40 men and 66 women; mean age = 21.75 years;
SD = 3.0; range = 18–37 years, 95% psychology students) were
included in the analysis. Participants were recruited from the
campus of the University of Innsbruck.
Materials
Participants completed the Self-Control Scale (SCS-K-D)
(α = 0.82) from Bertrams and Dickhäuser (2009) (13 items).
They also completed the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS)
(Grant et al., 2002), which is divided into the Self-Reflection
Scale (α = 0.85) (12 items) and the Insight Scale (α = 0.84) (eight
items). The Achievement Motives Scale (Lang and Fries, 2006),
(10 items), which is divided into two dimensions, hope of success
(five items, α = 0.77) and fear of failure (five items, α = 0.81), was
used to identify the motives of participants. The Construction
Task was adapted from the classical sunk-cost cases provided
by Arkes and Blumer (1985) and van Putten et al. (2010). In
the intervention, participants had to decide for a fictional ‘other
person’ to use the construction that the participant has made
or the alternative construction (“Please put yourself in the role
of a person who has not worked on your construction and
has to make the same decision as you. In your opinion, which
construction should the person take?”). The intervention and
the actual decision were binary-coded (adopting the self-built
construction versus taking the alternative construction).
The assessment of Competence Satisfaction (α = 0.90, seven
Items) was adapted from Bach (2009) and Dörner and Güss
(2013), and the estimated probability of the success of the
construction was rated on a number scale ranging from 0 to 100%
(where 0% equaled no chance of winning the money with the
construction, and 100% equaled a safe win).
The items were preceded by the sentences: “With my
solution/the alternative solution, I associate. . .” (...the feeling
of being in control of this situation;... the feeling of being
effective in my actions;... a positive feeling, because I think
that I’m successful with it;... generally a positive feeling); and
“My solution/the alternative solution . . .” (...gives my self-esteem
a positive feeling;...gives me the feeling of being able to do
something actively;...makes me feel self-determined). Items were
scored on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The alternative construction was coded with a 50% chance
of winning. Pre-tests showed a 30% chance of winning when
the participants’ own constructions were used. The functionality
of the constructions was physically tested at the end of the
experiment.
Procedures
The researcher welcomed the participants and led them to
their seats. A maximum of three participants was tested at
the same time. The working spaces were divided by partitions
to prevent any communication. After a short introduction, in
which participants were asked not to use their phones or talk
to each other, they were required to wear earplugs. Afterward,
participants were randomly assigned to the group with or without
the debiasing intervention.
In both conditions, participants completed a demographic
survey, the SRIS from Grant et al. (2002), the SCS-K-D from
Bertrams and Dickhäuser (2009), and the Achievement Motives
Scale from Lang and Fries (2006). Then, participants were
assigned a decision-making task, adapted from the cases of Arkes
and Blumer (1985) and van Putten et al. (2010). In this case,
participants were asked to take the role of the project leader in
a company that produced packing solutions. The goal was to
design and build a construction, within 30 min, which could
protect a raw egg when dropped from a height of 3 m. For this
task, participants were provided with 15€ and presented with a
selection of different materials that they could purchase [a straw
(0.50€), 0.5 m of rope (2€), 4 cm of tape (0.50€), one napkin
(0.50€), a plastic cup with a volume of 0.2 l (2.50€), a DinA4 paper
(1€), a balloon (2€), a plastic bag (2.50€), a cotton pad (0.50€)].
They were allocated 10 min to think about their construction and
buy the materials they would need. There was no restriction on
how many units of an item they could purchase. The incentive
to build economic solutions was that participants could keep any
funds remaining in their budget after purchasing the materials
but only if their solution worked (i.e., if the egg survived the
3 m drop). For example, with an investment of 10€ in materials,
they could earn 5€ if the egg survived the drop. Subsequently,
participants’ understanding of the conditions of the task, and the
possibility of winning money was checked using a short survey.
After the 10-min planning and purchasing phase, the 20-
min construction phase began. In this phase, participants once
again had an opportunity to order new materials. At the end
of the construction phase, participants were notified that there
was another type of construction available, which they could use
for the drop. They could not view the construction but were
informed that this alternative construction would perform better
than the average self-created construction. They then had to
weigh up the possibility of success of their own construction set
against this other alternative.
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The control group had to decide which of the two
constructions they would like to use for the drop: their own, on
which they had planned and worked for 30 min and had invested
money, or the alternative construction. The experimental group,
however, received a short intervention (adapted from Kahneman
et al., 2011) before their choice. They had to consider what
a new project leader, who had not worked on either of the
solutions, should choose. They noted down the reasons for their
decision regarding this extra choice. After making this decision,
the participants of the experimental group then had to make the
choice for themselves.
Subsequently, both groups assessed the two solutions for their
Competence Satisfaction. After assessing the constructions and
choosing between them, the functionality test was conducted.
If participants chose the AO, a generator with a 50% chance
of winning was used to decide if they could keep the rest of
their budget. If participants chose their own construction, the
researcher dropped their construction from a height of 3 m. The
remaining budget was given to them only if the egg survived the
drop.
Design
Participants were assigned to conditions in a 2 × 2 design
(experimental group/control group × sunk-cost option
selectors/alternative option selectors). The experiment was
designed to test whether an intervention inducing a self-
reflection process leads to a reduced selection of the SCO in
comparison to the control group without an intervention.
Moreover, after the choice was made, the reasons for the
decision were assessed on a need-regulative level. Responses
to scales for self-control, self-reflection, and achievement
motivation were obtained to check for differences between the
groups.
RESULTS
To check Hypothesis 1, which assumed that need regulation
is positively linked to choosing the SCO, the assessment of
Competence Satisfaction was analyzed (Figure 1). Interestingly,
the SCO-Selectors assessed the SCO as more satisfactory in
terms of competence (median = 4.00) than did the AO-Selectors
(median = 2.86, U = 201.5, p < 0.001). According to Cohen
(1992), this indicates a medium effect (r = 0.40). A significant
difference was also found in the assessment of the AO. The AO-
Selectors rated the AO higher (median = 2.86) than did the
SCO-Selectors (median = 1.86, U = 244.5, p < 0.001). According
to Cohen (1992), this indicates a medium effect (r = 0.36).
This difference was not only found between the two groups
but also within the group of SCO-Selectors, who rated the SCO
significantly higher (M = 4.01, SD = 0.86) than the AO (M = 2.07,
SD = 0.90, t = 15.46, p < 0.001, n = 92, r = 0.85). No such
difference was found in the assessment of the AO-Selectors.
Running a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, no significant differences
were found between the ratings of the SCO (median = 2.94) and
those of the AO (median = 2.95, z = −0.189, p = 0.850, n = 14,
r = 0.05).
FIGURE 1 | Rating of competence satisfaction for the two options.
Concerning the success probability of the option, which was
assessed on a percentage scale (where 0% meant no chance
of protecting the egg, and 100% equaled an effective, safe
construction), in both groups, participants assessed the AO
as significantly safer (M = 64.06, SD = 15.37) than the SCO
(M = 52.38, SD = 21.90, t = −6.42, p < 0.001, N = 106, r = 0.53).
This effect could also be seen when the success probability was
analyzed depending on the decision (see Figure 2). Following
expectations, a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test indicated that the
AO-Selectors rated the AO significantly higher (median = 61.00)
than the SCO (median = 26.00, z = −3.30, p < 0.001, n = 14).
According to Cohen’s effect size (1992), r = 0.88 indicates a
strong effect. Surprisingly, the SCO-Selectors also rated the AO
significantly higher (M = 64.27, SD = 15.88) than their own
chosen SCO (M = 56.13, SD = 20.67, t = −4.68, p < 0.001, n = 91,
r = 0.19).
The SCO-Selectors assessed the SCO with a higher success
probability (median = 59.50) than did the AO-Selectors
(median = 26.00, U = 161.5, p < 0.001). According to Cohen
(1992), this indicates a medium effect (r = 0.44).
There were no significant differences between the
experimental and control groups with respect to the scores
on the SRIS [Levene-test: F(1,104) = 1.417, p = 0.237, N = 106]
(Hypothesis 2a). The Self-Control Scale [t(104) = 0.107,
p = 0.915] and the Achievement Motives Scale for the
dimensions ‘hope of success’ [t(104) = 1.594, p = 0.114]
and ‘fear’ [t(104) = 0.527, p = 0.599] also showed no differences
between the groups (Hypothesis 2b). The amount of investment
in the construction and the decision revealed no significant
findings (χ2 = 0.354, p = 0.552, df = 1).
Moreover, the analysis did not reveal any significant
differences between the SCO-Selectors and the AO-Selectors
regarding the SRIS (U = 461.0, p = 0.087, r = 0.17), the Self-
Control Scale (U = 595.5, p = 0.651, r = 0.04), or the Achievement
Motives Scale in the dimensions ‘hope of success’ (U = 556.5,
p = 0.410, r = 0.08) and ‘fear’ (U = 441.5, p = 0.058, r = 0.18).
To check for the effect of the intervention (Hypothesis 3),
we took a closer look at participants in the experimental group.
Before deciding on whether to choose their own option (SCO)
or the AO, they had to decide on behalf of an external person,
who was not involved in the process. The majority chose the
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FIGURE 2 | Subjective probability of success for the two options.
AO (86.5%, n = 45), rather than the SCO (13.5%, n = 7, exact
binominal test, two-sided, p < 0.001, n = 52).
However, when making the actual decision (which option
to use for the egg test), the groups showed similar results. In
the experimental group, 45 participants chose the SCO (86.5%)
and only seven, the AO (13.5%). Running a two-sided binomial
test revealed a significant deviation from the expected 50%
distribution (p < 0.001, n = 52). In the control group, a similar
picture was observed: 47 participants chose the SCO (87%) and
seven, the AO (13%). A two-sided binominal test also showed
a significant deviation from the expected 50% distribution
(p < 0.001, n = 54). A binominal test was conducted taking 87% of
the control group as a reference point; the analysis did not show
any significant difference between the two groups (p = 0.522,
n = 52).
Taken together, the results show that 33.7% of the 92
SCO-Selectors were successful and won an average of 4.76€
(median = 5.00); 71.4% of the 14 AO-Selectors were successful
and won an average of 4.05€ (median = 4.00). The difference was
not significant (U = 107.00, p = 0.136).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we placed participants in a situation
where they were confronted with two options; one of these
was the so-called SCO (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Greitemeyer
et al., 2005). With the materials that could be purchased from
a given budget, the aim was to build a construction to protect
a raw egg from a 3-m drop. They could only “win” any
money left over from the budget if the egg survived the drop
without damage. After building their own construction for the
drop-test, participants were confronted with an AO, with a
reportedly higher possibility of securing the remaining money.
Subsequently, they had to decide whether they wanted to use
their own construction or the alternative construction for the
drop. With either option, participants had the chance to win the
remaining money from the budget. If the participants persisted
with their own option, on which they had invested time, money,
and effort, despite being informed that this would generate, on
an average, a lower chance of winning, it was rated a “sunk-cost
effect.”
To take a deeper look into the reasons behind the decisions
made, we analyzed the choice from a psychological needs
perspective, based on the Psi theory (Dörner et al., 2002;
Bach, 2009). The focus of this analysis was on the need
for competence. The need for competence describes one’s
perception of active control over the environment. Signals of
effectiveness add a positive value in terms of competence;
signals of ineffectiveness do the opposite, decreasing the
levels in the competence “reservoir” (Dörner and Güss, 2013).
Having invested in vain in a particular option would send a
significant signal of ineffectiveness to the participant. Therefore,
choosing the SCO would protect the individual from this
negative feeling, in the short term (Dörner, 1996). Taking
this into account, we analyzed if need-regulation can better
explain why people make economically “irrational” decisions
(Simon, 1955), assuming a mechanism of need-regulation, which
leads to biased decisions, from the normative point of view
(Dörner, 1996, 1999; Strohschneider, 2003; Dörner and Güss,
2013). From this perspective, the decision-maker favors the
option which adds most value concerning their psychological
needs, rather than the option which is likely to maximize
their chances of winning. From the viewpoint of rationality,
participants followed an instrumental rationality when choosing
an option.
The most remarkable result was that when participants had
to make the decision, it did not matter which option was
more promising regarding likely returns. This directly violates
the expectation that an individual will act according to the
homo oeconomicus model (Simon, 1955). Participants rather
chose the option which potentially maintained or boosted
their feeling of competence. Results from the list of reasons
for their choice indicated that the SCO-Selectors made their
choice to check their effectiveness in building the construction.
However, the AO-Selectors lacked such confidence in their
construction. When they expected that their construction would
fail to protect the egg, using the SCO equaled a possible
threat to their feelings of competence. The data showed that
in this case, participants chose the AO because this option
gave them a higher chance of winning while also avoiding the
potential signal of ineffectiveness from the failure of their own
construction.
The intervention that aimed at changing participant’s
rationality by inducing self-reflection (Donovan et al., 2015)
worked in the first stage (Kahneman et al., 2011); participants
reported that the other person should take the AO, given
it was likely the “better” one. In the second stage, however,
when they had to choose for themselves, this prior normative
rational insight did not prevent them from choosing their own,
reportedly less successful, option. According to Evans and Over
(1996), participants showed more normative rationality (acting
according to the homo oeconomicus model, selecting the option
with the maximum chance of winning) when choosing for others
but switched to an instrumental rationality (achieving personal
goals) when choosing for themselves. As participants reported a
higher need satisfaction from their chosen option, we suppose
that regulation of the need for competence might be an important
aspect concerning the formation of personal goals.
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Limitations and Outlook
The intervention showed no impact on preventing participants
from choosing the SCO. Even when making the normative
rational choice for someone else, they still picked the SCO when
they made the decision for themselves. The reason could be
that the intervention did not involve the satisfaction of needs.
Even when participants were able to reflect on the situation
consciously, they still had an (unconscious) urge to regulate
their needs. An intervention designed to satisfy needs before the
decision is made regarding their own choice might lead to better
results.
As proportionally so many participants chose their own
option, we had to use some non-parametric tests. Our
explanation for this imbalance lies in the task itself. In artificial
cases, more people choose the rational option (for instance,
between 29 and 44% resisted the sunk-cost bias in the control
groups of Hafenbrack et al., 2014). However, in our more
“realistic” scenario, persisting with their own SCO seemed to have
a stronger pull. It would be very interesting for future research to
examine whether there is a financial threshold where participants
would be more influenced by the option with a higher possibility
of winning than the regulation of needs. Future research could
conduct a systematic research on various cognitive biases and the
need-regulative function during the decision process.
The presented findings are correlational and are based on self-
report measures. Therefore, it remains unclear if need-regulation
leads to the sunk-cost effect, the sunk-cost effect triggers the
need-regulation, or both. Future research should include these
considerations.
CONCLUSION
Is the observed behavior irrational? The answer depends on
the point of view; from a normative view, some participants
acted irrationally when they did not choose the option which
maximized their chance of winning. However, when taking the
instrumental rationality (Evans and Over, 1996) into account,
there could be a different interpretation. Instrumental rationality
states that a person acts to achieve his or her goals. In the
given situation, participants worked on their solution, invested
time, money, and effort. Being confronted with the thought of
having done this in vain might be a strong negative signal to
their competence. Subsequently, along with the goal to choose
the option with the highest chance of winning, the goal to
regulate the need for competence also arises. Therefore, choosing
their own option, even when it had a lower chance of winning
the money, might serve a personal goal: to maintain or even
increase their feeling of competence. Is the sunk-cost effect a
bias? Yes and no. From a normative point of view, involving
sunk costs into a decision is a deviation from the normative
model, and therefore, a “bias.” However, this only applies from
the normative perspective. From the viewpoint of instrumental
rationality, the sunk-cost effect serves personal goals which can
differ from the normative standards. Therefore, reflecting back on
the framework of grounded rationality (Elqayam, 2012), a “bias”
can be seen as a behavior that is rational to the decision maker
in an epistemic context, if the “bias” facilitates the achievement
of the decision maker’s goals within his or her physical or mental
limitations.
According to Strohschneider (2003), we can observe a shift
from a goal-oriented behavior to a need-regulation oriented
behavior. Typically, this shift should not pose a problem but when
the decision-maker is not aware of it, he or she might gain a short-
term regulation of the need but fails to maximize their chances of
attaining their objective in the long run. Additionally, the goals
arising from the need-regulation do not necessarily have to be
conscious to the decision-maker. Therefore, the final question
would be: even when the exhibited behavior is in some way
rational, is it the way I want to or should act in the given situation?
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